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I. THE EXECUTIVE-ORDER RESERVATION CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEM1 
Federal Indian law constitutional doctrine markedly differs from other, 
mainstream constitutional law doctrine. Mainstream constitutional law 
fairly clearly separates Congress’ power from the President’s power.2 But, 
Indian law constitutional doctrine has failed to clearly separate Congress’ 
power from executive and judicial power.3 
In essence, congressional primacy has evolved in federal Indian law over 
the past 150 years.4 For instance, Congress passed the March 3, 1871, 
Indian Appropriations Act (1871 Act) purporting to bar the President from 
negotiating treaties and agreements with Indian tribes;5 the 1885 Major 
Crimes Act defining federal crimes on Indian land;6 the 1887 General 
Allotment (Dawes) Act breaking reservations into distinct lots resulting in 
                                                                                            
1 See Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis 
Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271 (2003). 
Pommersheim critiqued Supreme Court doctrine in Indian law. Id. But, his paper did not 
examine executive-order reservations and came before United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193 (2004). 
2 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 
233–83 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES]; ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317–427 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 357–405 (5th ed. 2005). 
3 See generally ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 167–252, 323–
91 (2d ed. 2010). 
4 Id. See generally CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE 
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 77–108 (6th ed. 2010); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25–81 (2002) (detailing the rise of 
Congress’ power in Indian affairs); WADE DAVIES & RICHMOND L. CLOW, AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND LAW: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 127–29 (2009) 
(listing references on federal plenary power). 
5 Rev. Stat. § 2079, Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
71). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW 149–50, 182–87 (5th ed. 2009); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 25. 
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Indians losing millions of acres and creating “checkerboard” reservations 
with vague boundaries;7 the 1934 Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) 
Act repealing the Dawes Act;8 Public Law 280 granting state criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian nations;9 the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act granting 
statutory rights like, but not the same as, those in the Bill of Rights and in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to tribe members;10 and the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702, regulating Indian gaming.11 
The Supreme Court has almost always upheld these acts of Congress. For 
instance, the Court has upheld denying state criminal jurisdiction on Indian 
land;12 the Major Crimes Act extending federal jurisdiction over many 
felonies on Indian land;13 Congress’ power to abrogate Indian treaties;14 
Congress’ power to recognize tribes;15 and Congress’ power to define tribal 
sovereignty.16 
                                                                                            
7 General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (Feb. 8, 1887). See generally CANBY, 
supra note 6, at 21–24; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–30. 
8 See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 25–26, 66; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4 at 
30–33; GELYA FRANK & CAROLE GOLDBERG, DEFYING THE ODDS: THE TULE RIVER 
TRIBE’S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN THREE CENTURIES 181–220 (2010) (providing 
context for the Indian Reorganization Act’s context and results). The Tule River and 
Hoopa Valley Reservations are both in California. Id. at 189. Executive orders formed the 
Tule River Reservation. Id. at 231–34. 
9 Act of Aug. 15, 1853, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, (codified in part at 218 U.S.C. § 1360 
(2012)). 
10 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012). See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 30–31, 152, 
394–408; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 36–37. 
11 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012). See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 333, 337–46; 
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 40. 
12 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.). See generally CANBY, 
supra note 6, at 18, 93–101. 
13 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (Miller, J.). See generally CANBY, 
supra note 6, at 38, 150. 
14 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 
39, 130–37. 
15 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
16 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also United States v. Lara, 
541 U.S. 193 (2004). See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 76–144 (tribal sovereignty).   
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The Supreme Court’s case law undergirding Congress’ primacy has been 
strongly questioned.17 In particular, Justice Thomas has criticized the 
Supreme Court’s separation of powers doctrine in federal Indian affairs.18 
First, Justice Thomas contrasted mainstream constitutional law with Indian 
law.19 He stressed neither the Treaty Clause20 nor the Indian Commerce 
Clause21 empowers Congress to decide Indian tribal sovereignty’s scope.22 
Justice Thomas also questioned Congress’ power to usurp the President’s 
treaty-making power through the 1871 Act.23 Instead, the President has 
innate power to recognize governments and to make treaties.24 Second, 
Thomas stressed Indian law doctrine’s logical conflict—Indian nations have 
sovereignty, but Congress can change that sovereignty. He thus reasoned 
the Court should either overrule United States v. Wheeler,25 which 
confirmed an Indian nation’s sovereignty to try and to convict its members 
independent of federal criminal law, or curtail Congress’ power over Indian 
sovereignty.26 
Returning federal power in Indian affairs from Congress to the President 
could have dramatic effects on Indian nations, especially regarding 
                                                                                            
17 Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cleveland, supra note 4, (questioning 
the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, under the Indian Commerce Clause in light of 
“vertical” separation of powers cases United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(striking the Violence Against Women Act) and Morrison v. Olson, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(striking the Gun-Free School Zones Act)). This paper considers “horizontal” separation 
of powers between the President and Congress. 
18 Lara, 541 U.S. at 215. 
19 Id. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
22 Lara, 541 U.S. at 215. 
23 Id. at 218 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Rev. Stat. § 2079, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 71)); Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2, § 3; United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203, 228–30 (1942)). 
24 See id. at 214–15. 
25 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
26 Lara, 541 U.S. at 214–227. 
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executive-order reservations. After the 1871 Act banning new Indian 
treaties, active combat waged on between the United States and many 
Indian nations.27 As battles and wars ended, the War Department bargained 
for, or imposed, Indian reservation partition plans.28 The President then 
approved and implemented the plans through executive orders.29 In this 
way, presidents created millions of acres of Indian reservations before 
Congress banned these executive orders in 1919.30 
But, Congress’ supremacy in Indian affairs and failure to approve the 
reservation land granted by executive orders have left Indian nations 
vulnerable to government takings of millions of acres without 
compensation. The Federal Circuit’s Karuk Tribe of California v. Ammon 
held executive orders forming reservation land and a tribe’s occupation of 
that land for 100 years failed to make a compensable right unless Congress 
expressly approved.31 In arguing for just compensation for taking 
reservation land, Judge Newman’s dissent stressed that the Fifth 
Amendment does not require title to land for compensation and that 
Congress wanted the executive-order reservations to be equal to 
reservations formed by treaties.32 
This paper looks at the effects of realigning the separation of powers 
between Congress and the President in Indian law to more resemble 
                                                                                            
27 E.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 231–32; DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 266–68 (5th ed. 2005). See generally 
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
ANOMALY 329–60 (1994). 
28 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 329–60. See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 19–21. 
29 CANBY, supra note 6, at 19–21. 
30 Id. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1–15 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
31 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374, 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Rader, J.) (citing Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 33 U.S. 86, 103 (1949); Sioux Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 325 (1942)). See generally CANBY, supra note 6, 
at 420–21. 
32 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1382–84 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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mainstream separation of powers. Section II reviews current doctrine on 
power separation between Congress and the President on mainstream issues 
and on federal Indian law. Section III looks at the effects of letting Indian 
sovereignty more closely match foreign-nation or domestic-state 
sovereignty under current mainstream separation of powers doctrine. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
This paper focuses on “horizontal” separation of powers between the 
President and Congress. Supreme Court case law sharply distinguishes 
between mainstream and Indian-affairs separation of powers. 
Section A describes mainstream separation of powers doctrine. The 
president has maximum power in foreign affairs. That power includes 
negotiating treaties (ratified by the Senate) and executive agreements with 
foreign nations. Presidents also may unilaterally abrogate treaties, and only 
the President can recognize governments. In contrast, in domestic affairs, 
the President has much less power. 
Section B describes Indian law separation of powers. Indian law 
separation of powers between the President and Congress has evolved 
differently. At first, the President treated Indian tribes as foreign nations. 
But eventually, in 1871, Congress sharply curtailed that power by banning 
the President from entering into new treaties with Indian tribes. Even so, 
over the past fifty years presidents have supported Indian self-
determination. Presidents may not abrogate Indian treaties, but Congress 
can. 
As noted, executive orders have created millions of acres of Indian 
reservations.33 Under current doctrine, the President has no innate power 
                                                                                            
33 CANBY, supra note 6, at 19–21; COHEN, supra note 30, §§ 15.04, 15.09[d][iii]. 
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over Indian land.34 In contrast, Congress has almost complete power to 
reshape Indian land.35 
A. Mainstream Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress 
The relevant areas of mainstream constitutional doctrine relate to foreign 
and domestic affairs. As will be discussed in section III, whether Indian 
affairs mimic, or should mimic, foreign or domestic affairs has been hotly 
debated. 
1. The President’s Power 
a) Foreign Power36 
This section very briefly reviews four foreign affairs powers. First, the 
Constitution grants the President the power to negotiate treaties ratified by 
the Senate.37 Second, along with treaties, the President can make executive 
agreements with other governments, which require no Senate ratification.38 
Third, implied by the President’s power to negotiate with other 
governments is the power to recognize them.39 Fourth, whether a pact is 
made by treaty or executive agreement, the President may abrogate it.40 
 
                                                                                            
34 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d 1366. 
35 Id. 
36 See generally CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES, supra note 2, at 366–73; 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 369–81; STONE ET AL., supra 
note 2. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
38 CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES, supra note 2, at 369. 
39 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(discussing the context of abrogating a treaty with Taiwan by President Carter’s 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(noting the President’s “well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw 
recognition from, foreign governments”). 
40 Id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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(1) Treaties Ratified by the Senate 
Presidents have the power to make treaties with foreign nations.41 The 
Court has placed very few limits on this power.42 Even so, treaties cannot 
conflict with constitutional provisions.43 Ratified treaty provisions become 
“the supreme Law of the Land,” on par with constitutional provisions,44 but, 
the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty do not trump treaties.45 
(2) Executive Agreements Without Senate Ratification 
Unlike treaties proper, executive agreements are harder to square with the 
Constitution, as no constitutional provision expressly binds the United 
States to an agreement with another nation without Senate ratification. Even 
so, the Supreme Court has affirmed the President’s power to make 
executive agreements between the United States and foreign governments 
without either Senate or House approval.46 Classic cases involving Russian 
insurance companies, nationalized during the Soviet revolution, upheld 
executive agreements as required to be implemented in state law.47 Later, 
the Court upheld executive agreements, which exchanged American 
hostages in Iran for the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States48 
and which enforced international insurance settlements.49 Despite executive 
agreements’ innately constitutionally suspect nature, the Court has never 
voided one.50 
                                                                                            
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
42 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1890). 
43 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
45 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 415 (1920). 
46 CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES, supra note 2, at 369. 
47 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 
(1937). 
48 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
49 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
50 CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES, supra note 2, at 368–69. 
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(3) Recognizing Governments 
The President’s power to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers”51 impliedly includes the power to recognize governments.52 In 
fact, the President’s power to negotiate treaties and executive agreements 
impliedly includes the power to recognize governments.53 
(4) Abrogating Treaties 
The Constitution does not mention presidential abrogation of agreements 
with other nations.54 In fact, it does not mention abrogating ratified treaties, 
unratified treaties, or executive agreements.55 Even so, in hearing a first-
impression case, by refusing to rule based on justiciability and ripeness,56 
the Court in essence upheld President Carter’s abrogation of the Sino-
American Mutual Defense Treaty.57 Thus, presidents can abrogate treaties. 
b) Domestic Power 
Unlike foreign affairs, the executive branch shares much of its power 
with the other branches in domestic affairs. Normally, the core domestic 
presidential power analysis weighs whether the President has acted with or 
                                                                                            
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
52 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(discussing the context of abrogating a treaty with Taiwan by President Carter’s 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1942)) (“Our 
cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to 
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes.”); STONE ET AL., supra note 
2, at 128 n.2 (summing up Goldwater’s history). 
53 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
54 Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
55 See id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring). 
56  Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (justiciability); id at 996 (Powell, J., 
concurring) (ripeness). 
57  Id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring); STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 128 n.2 (summing 
up Goldwater’s history). 
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against Congress’ approval, or in an area where Congress has not expressed 
its will.58 Presidential power is strongest when acting with Congress’ 
approval59 and weakest when acting against Congress’ approval.60 When 
Congress has not expressed its will on an issue, the President relies only on 
innate constitutional power.61 But, Congress’ long-standing acceptance 
enhances presidential power in an area.62 These approaches imply some 
innate domestic presidential power. Other approaches positing the President 
lacks innate domestic power now seem unworkable, as presidents can 
domestically enforce executive agreements with other nations.63 
2. Congress’ Power 
Though the Constitution lists many congressional powers, only three 
readily relate to the analysis here. First, the Senate ratifies treaties by a two-
thirds vote.64 Second, to give a treaty practical domestic effect, Congress 
normally passes statutes compatible with the ratified treaty.65 But, some 
treaties’ wording make their domestic effects clear, and thus self-executing 
without congressional statutes.66 Third, the Indian Commerce Clause lets 
Congress “regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
                                                                                            
58 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 637. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
63 Compare Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 585, 587–88 (Black, J.) (holding that the President 
lacks innate domestic power), with Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) 
(upholding domestically enforcing an executive agreement exchanging hostages for 
assets), and Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (upholding domestically 
enforcing an executive agreement on insurance settlements). 
64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
65 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (plurality) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 
66 Id. (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (2 Pet. 253) (1829) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
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States, and with the Indian Tribes.”67 In practice, the Court has placed 
almost no limits on Congress’ Commerce Clause power.68 
B. Indian Law’s Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress 
1. Treaty Power 
a) The President’s Original Power 
Before the Constitution, Europeans treated Indian nations as foreign 
governments. For instance, Britain and France made treaties with Indians 
before American independence.69 Under the Articles of Confederation, both 
the states and the federal government signed treaties with Indian nations.70 
The Constitution changed these practices. James Madison and John Jay 
knew well the Articles of Confederation’s ambiguous language letting both 
state and federal powers negotiate with Indians.71 So, Madison proposed the 
Constitution’s less ambiguous Indian Commerce Clause to grant power to 
the federal government to negotiate with tribes.72 
After the Constitution was ratified, President George Washington sent the 
1789 Treaties of Fort Harmar and the 1790 New York Creek Treaty, 
negotiated under the Articles of Confederation, to the Senate for approval.73 
Once the Senate resolved to “execute and enjoin” one Indian treaty, 
President Washington urged it to treat Indian nation treaties as equal to 
European-nation treaties.74 The Senate’s resulting ratification of the treaties 
                                                                                            
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
68 See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 242–73. 
69 E.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 28. 
70 Id. at 30–31. 
71 Id. at 31 (quoting JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 284–285 (James 
Madison) (J.E. Cook ed., 1961)); JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 96 (John Jay) 
(Isaak Kramnick ed., 1987). 
72 E.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 31. 
73 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[2]; PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 70–79. 
74 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[2]; PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 71–72. 
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started the federal government’s recognition of Indian nations as equal to 
European foreign nations.75 
This treaty-making pattern by the secretaries of war, state, and interior 
lasted for decades.76 For instance, Secretary of War Henry Knox77 and 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson78 under President Washington, and, 
later, Secretary of War James McHenry under President Adams,79 arranged 
treaties with Indian nations. Into the nineteenth century, Secretary of War 
Henry Dearborn under President Jefferson continued the treaty-making 
process with scant change,80 as did Secretary of War William Eustis under 
President James Madison.81 As late as 1830, President Andrew Jackson 
publicly recognized Indian nations as self-ruling and analogized them with 
foreign nations.82 
b) Congress’ Encroachment on the President’s Treaty Power83 
By the Civil War’s end, this treaty-making pattern had greatly changed.84 
Though Congress had passed almost no laws directly regulating tribes under 
the Indian Commerce Clause,85 the March 29, 1867 Act repealed “all laws 
allowing the President, the secretary of the interior, or the commissioner of 
Indian affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian tribes.”86 Within four 
                                                                                            
75 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[2]; PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 72–73. 
76 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 209; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 78–79. 
77 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 79–102. 
78 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[2]; PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 93–94. 
79 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 88. 
80 Id. at 103, 105–07, 113–14, 117–19, 123–26. 
81 Id. at 121, 127–28. 
82 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[4][b] (quoting Andrew Jackson, the Annual Report 
of the President to Congress (Dec. 7, 1830)). 
83 See generally Cleveland, supra note 4 (detailing Congress’ power rise in Indian 
affairs). 
84 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 1.103[9]. 
85 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 78 (citing Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal 
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002)). 
86 Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 29, 1869, 40 Cong. ch. 13, 15 Stat. 7). 
1206  SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
months, Congress repealed the Act.87 But, four years later, Congress passed 
the March 3, 1871, Indian Appropriations Act (1871 Act) mandating that 
“no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty.”88 
2. Recognizing Indian Nations/Tribes 
a) Modern Presidents’ Policies Pseudo-Recognizing Indian Nations and 
Promoting Indian Self-Rule 
Despite Congress’ ban on formally recognizing Indian nations and tribes, 
presidents have recognized Indian nations and tribes as separate 
sovereigns.89 President Franklin D. Roosevelt began a shift away from a 
colonial approach on Indian nations toward self-rule.90 But, during the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the Termination Era policies 
wiped out many tribes in trying to blend Indians into the United States.91 
Even so, the 1960s’ presidents furthered Indian-nation self-rule. In 1961, 
following campaign promises to protect Indian land and promote Indian 
economic growth, President John F. Kennedy called the American Indian 
Chicago Conference for Indian leaders to discuss Indians’ status and 
                                                                                            
87 Id. (citing Act of July 20, 1867, 40 Cong. ch. 34, 15 Stat. 18). 
88 Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1871, § 1, 41 Cong. ch. 120; 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 71). See generally PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 287–310 (describing events 
leading to the 1871 Act banning treaty-making with Indians). 
89 Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country After Plains 
Commerce Bank: State Courts and the Judicial Sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, 33 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 385, 387 n.11 (2008). 
90 Bruce E. Johansen, Native American Self-Government and Its Impact on Democracy’s 
Development, in NATIVE AMERICANS 21, 26–27 (Donald A. Grinde, Jr. ed., 2002); 
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 30–31; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 132. 
91 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 142–51; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 33–
35. 
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future.92 After Kennedy’s death in 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
indirectly strengthened Indian self-rule by stressing local poverty-program 
control.93 Also, the 1964 Equal Employment Opportunity Act granted 
Indian nations the power to run pilot school, college, and social projects.94 
In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon opened a new Indian self-rule era.95 
He rejected termination policies in favor of letting Indian nations manage 
federal programs.96 In essence, Nixon sought to extend Johnson’s approach 
beyond the War on Poverty to many more federal programs. As a first step, 
he proposed letting tribes choose to “take over the control or operation of 
Federally funded and administered programs in the Department of Interior 
and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.”97 President Nixon 
based his policy on moral and legal concepts implied by the treaty 
relationship between the United States and Indian nations.98 
Unlike Nixon’s approach, in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan pushed 
self-rule based on economics.99 As part of his general push to prune the 
federal government, President Reagan stressed tribal government self-
sufficiency through economic growth and local tribal taxes.100 Reagan also 
formed the Commission on Indian Reservation Economies.101 The 
                                                                                            
92 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 152; Furnish, supra note 89, at 27; GOLDBERG ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 34–35. 
93 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 152. 
94 Id. 
95 Richard M. Nixon, Pres., Special Message on Indian Affairs, Jul. 8, 1970 as reprinted 
in ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 153–55; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 37. 
96 Nixon, supra note 95. 
97 Id. at 155. 
98 Id. at 153–54. 
99 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 39–40. 
100 Id. (quoting 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD 
REAGAN, 1983, at 96, 97 (1984)). 
101 Id. at 40. 
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Commission’s 1984 report stressed privatizing reservation economic growth 
by placing it in the hands of private Indian firms.102 
Continuing this modern presidential policy recognizing tribal rule, in the 
1990s President William Jefferson Clinton told executive departments to 
interact with tribes on government-to-government footing, thus recognizing 
tribal sovereignty.103 President Clinton also met with many tribal leaders on 
government-to-government footing.104 Very late in his presidency, Clinton 
also urged administrative changes that would recognize tribes.105 
On taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush withdrew President 
Clinton’s tribe-recognition proposals.106 But in 2002, while proclaiming 
Native American Heritage Month, President Bush announced that he would 
continue Clinton’s policy of recognizing tribal governments.107 
President Barack Obama assumed office in 2009 after campaign 
commitments to rebuild Indian nations.108 President Obama has restored 
government-to-government meetings with Indian nations.109 
b) Congress’ Recognition of Indian Nations/Tribes 
Unlike the United States’ recognition of foreign nations, Congress has 
detailed how the federal government will recognize tribes.110 By statute, 
“‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized 
group or community . . . which is recognized as eligible for the special 
                                                                                            
102 Id. 
103 Furnish, supra note 89, at 387 n.11 (quoting Presidential Memorandum, 59 Fed. Reg. 
22,951 (May 4, 1994); citing Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 
2000)); see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 41. 
104 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 41. 
105 Id. at 42. 
106 Id. 
107 Furnish, supra note 89, at 387 n.11 (citing Proclamation No. 7620, 67 Fed. Reg. 
67,773 (Nov. 6, 2002)). 
108 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 42. 
109 Id. 
110 See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 253–74. 
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programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of 
their status as Indians.”111 In practice, Congress has assigned recognition to 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs by applying the Mandatory Criteria for Federal 
Acknowledgement.112  
3. Treaty Abrogation113 
a) Presidential Treaty Abrogation 
As Goldwater v. Carter, decided in 1979, seems to have been a first-
impression case,114 presidents seem to have not independently abrogated 
foreign-nation treaties without Congress’ approval before the 1871 Act. In 
contrast, President Zachary Taylor’s February 6, 1850, executive order 
purported to end Chippewa usufructuary, hunting and fishing, treaty 
rights.115 In 1999, relying mainly on Steel Seizure, the Court voided 
Taylor’s executive order due to a lack of Congress’ authorization.116 Thus, 
though the President can independently abrogate a treaty with a foreign 
nation,117 the President cannot abrogate a treaty with an Indian nation 
without Congress’ approval.118 
The Court’s rulings on Indian law treaties stem partly from traditional 
canons construing treaties to favor Indians:  
                                                                                            
111 Id. at 253 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2012)); accord 1871 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 
120, 16 Stat. 566 (banning federal government recognition of Indian nations without 
Congress’ approval). 
112 25 C.F.R. § 83.7; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 272–73. 
113 See generally CANBY, supra note 6, at 130–37. 
114 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
115 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 172, 175 (1999). 
116 Id. at 188–94 (mainly relying on Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 
343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (main opinion) (Black, J.)). 
117 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring). 
118 Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. at 188–94 (voiding an 1850 executive order purporting to 
abrogate hunting and fishing treaty rights mainly relying on Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 
585 (main opinion) (Black, J.)). 
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The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties, 
agreements, statutes and executive orders be liberally construed in 
favor of the Indians; all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of 
the Indians; in addition, treaties and agreements are to be construed 
as the Indians would have understood them; and tribal property 
rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s (sic) intent 
to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.119 
Treaties are like contracts between sovereigns.120 In fact, Chief Justice 
John Marshall explained applying special construction canons to Indian 
treaties by analogy with adhesion contracts.121 Though the cannons’ force 
has wavered, the courts still apply them to interpret treaties, statutes, 
executive orders, and administrative rules.122 The Court has implied the 
canons to preserve Indian nation sovereignty absent Congress’ clear 
intent.123 
b) Congress’ Treaty Abrogation124 
Ratified treaties may or may not need statutes to implement them. When 
“treaty stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced 
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.”125 But, a treaty is 
                                                                                            
119 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 172 (quoting COHEN, supra note 30, § 2.02[1]). 
120 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. 
121 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 172 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 
(1832)); see also PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 233 (discussing treaties as contracts, with the 
United States as the much more powerful party); id. at 440 (quoting communication from 
Comm’r of Indian Affairs Luke Lea to A.H.H. Stuart regarding Fort Laramie Treaty of 
1851 (May 29, 1852)). 
122 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 202–24 (discussing canon application history and 
modern case law overview); CANBY, supra note 6, at 122–30 (discussing treaty-
construction history since 1900). 
123 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 219 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 60 (1978)). 
124 See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 118–25, 175–85 (providing case 
excerpts on congressional treaty abrogation in federal Indian law). 
125 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (plurality opinion) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 
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“‘equivalent to an act of the legislature’ and hence self-executing, when it 
‘operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.’”126 
Thus, Congress can abrogate a treaty.127 First, Congress impliedly 
abrogates a treaty when it fails to pass laws putting a non-self-executing 
treaty into effect.128 Second, when Congress expressly resolves to refuse to 
implement a treaty or passes a statute directly against a treaty provision, 
Congress expressly abrogates a treaty.129 
By analogy with foreign nations,130 Congress can abrogate treaties with 
Indian nations.131 Congress began abrogating Indian treaties before the 1871 
Act, which claimed to end all Indian treaty-making.132 
                                                                                            
126 Id. (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (2 Pet. 253) (1829) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
127 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600–02 
(1889). 
128 See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. 
129 Id.  
130 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600–02. 
131 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 
130 U.S. at 600; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 270 (1898); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 
U.S. 504, 511 (1896); Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 405 (1896); Mo., Kan. & Tex. 
Ry. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 117 (1894); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870), 
sub nom. 207 Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco v. United States, 78 U.S. 616) 
(citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600; Thomas, 169 U.S. at 270; Ward, 163 
U.S. at 511; Spalding, 160 U.S. at  405; Roberts, 152 U.S. at 117; Cherokee Tobacco, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, sub nom. 207 Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco, 20 L. Ed. 
227)) (analogizing treaties with Indians to treaties with foreign nations to explain 
Congress’ power to abrogate an 1867 treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache 
Tribes). 
132 COHEN, supra note 30, § 1.03[7], n.315 (citing ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE 
SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN LAW ON TRIAL 141 (Rev. ed. 1993)). 
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4. Removing or Reallocating Reservation Land Including Executive-
Order Reservations—Karuk Tribe of California v. Ammon133 
Normally, Indian tribes and their members do not possess title to 
reservation land.134 Instead, they only have occupancy rights.135 
a) The President’s Power 
Presidents began reserving land for Indians at least as early as 1855.136 
After the 1871 Act claiming to end treaty-making, presidents greatly sped 
up issuing executive orders reserving land for Indian nations.137 Mostly, the 
Supreme Court upheld these set-asides.138 In particular, the Court upheld a 
president’s withdrawal of oil and gas deposits from public land based on 
Congress’ implied acquiescence shown in the face of presidential formation 
of Indian reservations by executive orders.139 Congress finally banned 
                                                                                            
133 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.). See 
generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 212–21 (providing case excerpts related to 
Indian title extinguishment by the US government); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The 
Chiricahua Apaches and the Assimilation Movement, 1865–1886: A Historical 
Examination, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 316–20 (2005–06) (summarizing the history of 
executive actions reclaiming reservation land and executive orders creating reservations, 
particularly with regard to the Apache). 
134 See generally CONFERENCE OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 
79–97 (Larry Long & Clay Smith eds., 4th ed. 2008). 
135 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1366, 1373–74. 
136 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 330; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 266 n.3. 
137 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 331. 
138 Id. at 330; Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867). 
[F]rom an early period in the history of the government it has been the practice 
of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public 
service required, parcels of land belonging to the United States to be reserved 
from sale and set apart for public uses. The authority of the President in this 
respect is recognized in numerous acts of Congress. 
 
Id.; see also PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 333 (quoting Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 
(1896)). 
139 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471–72 (1915) (citing Grisar, 73 U.S. 
(6 Wall.) at 381, 474–75, 481–83). Cf. Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at  1370, 1374. As 
noted below, the Federal Circuit rejected a longstanding argument that the lawmaking 
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presidents from reserving land for Indians by executive orders in 1919.140 
Yet even after the ban, courts upheld presidential power to set aside land for 
Indians due to “longstanding Congressional and public acquiescence.”141 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, presidents have no innate power 
over Indian land. Since Congress’ 1919 Act banning new executive-order 
reservations, presidents cannot reserve land for Indians without Congress’ 
prior approval.142 Presidents also have “no authority to convey any interest 
in public lands without a clear and definite delegation in an Act of 
Congress.”143 And, absent Congress’ prior approval, presidents may not 
shrink, abolish, or reallocate any reservation land, even land reserved by 
executive orders.144 
                                                                                            
history of the 1927 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a–398e (1994), 
acknowledged Indian title to executive-order reservation land. Id. at 1379 (citing United 
States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 93 (1972); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317, 330–31 (1942); United States v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 656, 687 (9th Cir. 
1976)). 
140 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 266 n.3 (citing 43 U.S.C.A. § 150). 
141 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 329 (citing CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS 
AND TREATIES 3: 692–95 (1913) (citing the Memorandum Regarding the Power of the 
President to Set Aside by Proclamation or Executive Order Public Lands for Indian 
Reservations and Other Public Purposes, and the Right of the President to Revoke Such 
Order), 4: 1056–64 (Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Att’y Gen., to Hubert Work, Secretary 
of the Interior, Executive Order Reservations (May 27, 1924)); Opinion by the Solicitor 
of the Department of the Interior as to the Extent or Character of Title Acquired by 
Indians in Lands Withdrawn for Their Benefit by Executive Order (Mar. 6, 1926)) 
(1904–41); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 65–57 
(1987)). 
142 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 15.04[4] (“no public lands of the United States shall be 
withdrawn by Executive Order, proclamation, or otherwise, for or as an Indian 
reservation except by an act of Congress” (quoting Act of June 30, 1919, ch 4§ 27, 41 
Stat. 3 §27)). 
143 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1374 (Rader, J.) (citing Sioux Tribe of Indians, 316 
U.S. at 325). 
144 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 15.04[4] n.135 (“[C]hanges in the boundaries of 
reservations created by Executive order . . . for the use and occupation of Indians shall 
not be made except by Act of Congress.” (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 398d)). 
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b) Congress’ Power 
In sharp contrast to the President’s power, the Court has held that 
Congress has almost limitless power to literally shape Indian land’s 
parameters. Congress may abrogate treaties related to reservation land,145 
remove Indian land,146 and reallocate land among Indian nations.147  
And, Congress may waive federal government sovereign immunity, 
letting land takings be compensable under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause.148 Cohen thinks Congress’ Indian land takings, except land briefly 
added to reservations,149 are subject to Fifth Amendment just 
compensation.150 But, this view sums up Congress’ modern political 
decisions, not a Constitutional restriction under Supreme Court case law.151 
c) Reallocating Executive-Order Reservations Without Compensation—
Karuk Tribe of California v. Ammon152 
Karuk involved Congress’ transfer of executive-order reservation land 
from one tribe to another.153 An executive order formed the original Hoopa 
Valley Reservation, the “Square,” on June 23, 1876.154 Another executive 
                                                                                            
145 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (White, J.). 
146 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1376 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 
(1973)). 
147 Id. at 1370. 
148 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S 371, 406–07 (1980). 
149 COHEN, supra note 30, § 15.04[4] (citing Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United 
States, 330 U.S. 169 (1947); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 325 
(1942)). 
150 COHEN, supra note 30, at § 15.04[4]. 
151 See Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1374, 1376–77 (quoting Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289 (1955)) (citing United States v. Alcea Band of 
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946)) (Indians’ occupancy rights “may be terminated and 
such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable 
obligation to compensate the Indians.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1370. 
154 Id. 
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order added the “Addition” to the Hoopa Valley Reservation in 1891.155 The 
1887 General Allotment (Dawes) Act resulted in non-Indian land scattered 
within the Hoopa Valley Reservation.156 Responding to suits over revenue 
from timber grown on the reservation,157 Congress’ Hoopa-Yurok 
Settlement Act cleaved the Hoopa Valley Reservation into the Square and 
the Addition.158 The Square became the Hoopa Valley Reservation while 
the Addition became the Yurok Reservation.159 Karuk tribe members had 
lived on both the Square and the Addition.160 The Karuk tribe, Yurok tribe, 
and Ammon Group sought just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause.161 
The Federal Circuit held they had no compensable Fifth Amendment 
property rights in the executive-order reservations.162 The Federal Circuit 
mainly reasoned only Congress could grant permanent occupancy, rather 
than permissive occupancy, for US land.163 Presidents Ulysses S. Grant and 
                                                                                            
155 Id. 
156 FRANK & GOLDBERG, supra note 8, at 60–61, 136, 138, 189.  
157 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1372–73 (citing Short v. United States, 486 F.2d 561, 
562 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Short v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 36, 40 (1987)). 
158 Id. at 1370, 1372–73 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1300i-1(c)). 
159 Id. at 1370. 
160 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 468, 470 (Fed. Cl. 1998), aff’d, 209 
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
161 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1370, 1374–75. The Federal Circuit also rejected a 
longstanding argument that the lawmaking history of the 1927 Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a–398e (1994), acknowledged title to executive-order reservation 
land. Id. at 1379 (citing United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 93 (1972); Sioux Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 330–31 (1942); United States v. S. Pac. Transp. 
Co., 543 F.2d 656, 687 (9th Cir. 1976)). The rejected arguments were based on Note, 
Tribal Property Interests in Executive Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 
69 YALE L.J. 627, 632–33 (1960). A Ninth Circuit court had already rejected these 
arguments. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27 (more discussion than in the fifth edition of 
2005); see also PRUCHA, supra note 27) (citing Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. 
Supp. 1183, 1192 (D. Ariz. 1978) (citing S. Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d at 687), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
162 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1376, 1378, 1380. 
163 Id. at 1373 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3). 
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Benjamin Harrison issued their executive orders forming the Square and the 
Addition under Congress’ April 8, 1864, Act.164 The Supreme Court had 
ruled the April 8, 1864, Act failed to grant Indians any compensable 
property right as “the Act of 1864 conferred a continuing discretion upon 
the [e]xecutive . . . for altering and enlarging the bounds of the reservations, 
restoring portions of the territory to the public domain, and abolishing 
reservations once made, and establishing others in their stead.”165 As 
Congress gave presidents very broad power to “create and terminate 
reservations, or parts of reservations, by fiat,” Congress could not have 
created compensable rights to the executive-order reservations.166 Further, 
President Grant’s and President Harrison’s executive orders included no 
words even trying to vest Indians with property rights against Congress’ 
intent.167 
III. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND MAINSTREAM SEPARATION OF 
POWERS APPLIED TO INDIAN NATIONS 
A. The Indian Nation Sovereignty Conundrum168—United States v. Lara169 
United States v. Lara concerned Indian nation sovereignty in criminal 
law.170 Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a person may not be prosecuted 
twice for the same crime.171 But, crimes are defined against one sovereign, 
                                                                                            
164 Id. at 1371, 1375. 
165 Id. at 1376 (quoting Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 257 (1913)). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1375. 
168 See generally Cleveland, supra note 4; CANBY, supra note 6, at 76–114; Patrice H. 
Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing Times, 
19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8 (2009) (discussing general history of tribal sovereignty); 
FRANK & GOLDBERG, supra note 8 (describing in depth the history of one tribe’s 
changing sovereignty in the face of European settlement and under the US government). 
169 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
170 Id. at 196–98 (Breyer, J.). 
171 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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so the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar prosecutions by different 
sovereigns—for instance, a state and the federal government.172 In Lara, 
after the Spirit Lake tribe convicted Billy Jo Lara—not a Spirit Lake 
member—for “violence to a policeman,” the United States charged him 
with assaulting a federal officer.173 
In upholding Lara’s federal prosecution, Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion reaffirmed some measure of the Spirit Lake tribal sovereignty apart 
from the federal government.174 Justice Breyer based the opinion on 
Congress’ power to define tribal sovereignty.175 He explained this power as 
derived from the Indian Commerce Clause176 and the Treaty Power.177 
Though the Treaty Power empowers the President—not Congress—to make 
treaties, the Senate’s power to ratify treaties gave it the power to pass the 
1871 Act banning the President from entering into Indian treaties.178 Breyer 
also stressed the Court had approved Congress’ power over Indian 
affairs.179 
But, Justice Thomas’ concurrence criticized the Court’s contradictory 
tribal-sovereignty case law.180 On the one hand, the Court has assumed 
“Congress (rather than some other part of the Federal Government) can 
regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering their 
sovereignty a nullity.”181 On the other hand, “the Indian tribes retain 
inherent sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own 
                                                                                            
172 Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 199. 
175 Id. at 199–200. 
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
177 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Lara, 541 U.S. at 200–02. 
178 See id. at 201. 
179 Id. at 202–07. 
180 Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
181 Id. 
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members.”182 Though he concurred in the judgment given these two 
assumptions, he disagreed with the majority’s view that Congress had 
plenary power to change tribal sovereignty.183 Justice Thomas did not see 
this congressional power flowing from either the Indian Commerce Clause 
or Treaty Clause.184 
To cure this contradiction in the Court’s case law, Justice Thomas argued 
the Court should hold tribes either have independent sovereignty or lack 
sovereignty.185 If tribes have sovereignty as independent nations, the 
executive would keep the power to make treaties with tribes, but Congress 
would lack the power to pass the 1871 Act banning treaties with the 
tribes.186 Conversely, if Congress has the power to ban treaties with tribes 
through the 1871 Act, tribes would lack independent-nation sovereignty, 
and United States v. Wheeler,187 holding Indian tribes kept enough 
sovereignty to define and to prosecute crimes among tribe members, should 
be overruled.188 
B. Applying Mainstream Separation of Powers Doctrine to Indian Nations                                                                 
and Executive-Order Reservations189 
The following analysis considers a change in view of Indian nation 
sovereignty under US law. But, sovereignty is famously hard to define.190 





186 See id. 
187 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
188 Lara, 541 U.S. at 215. 
189 Goldberg has previously compared and contrasted Indian sovereignty with sovereignty 
of foreign governments and domestic states, but the comparison did not consider Lara, 
executive-order reservations, or Karuk. See Carol Goldberg, Critique by Comparison in 
Federal Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 719 (2006). 
190 See, e.g., JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESSES: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 63–65, 107–09, 277, 415, 1059–60 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
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Sovereignty can connote a state’s or nation’s freedom to act.191 The 
Mohawk Nation192 and Thakiwa193 have, in essence, expressed this view. 
The Mohawk Nation claims sovereignty independent of other governments 
and a right to make laws for its people and land.194 Likewise, the Thakiwa 
see their sovereignty as derived from the Creator, and independent of Euro–
American law and other governments’ wills.195 Under this view, Indian 
nations should have “interpretive sovereignty” to interpret their treaties 
rather than solely relying on the United States’ interpretation.196 
Rather than defining sovereignty as freedom, sovereignty may mean 
traits letting a state take part in a legal group.197 Thus, a sovereign nation or 
country may make agreements with other nations or countries or take part in 
international legal groups such as the United Nations. Likewise, states 
within the United States retain sovereignty and take part in the group of 
states within the union.198 
Regardless of sovereignty’s precise meaning, the Indian Commerce 
Clause grants power to Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”199 It is 
thus natural to deem Indian tribes having sovereignty like “foreign Nations” 
                                                                                            
191 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8–10 (1995), as 
reprinted in DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 190, at 63. 
192 Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs to National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations 
of Canada (July 1996), as reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 225 
[hereinafter Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs]. 
193 Dagmar Thorpe, Sovereignty, A State of Mind: A Thakiwa Citizen’s Viewpoint, 23 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 481, 481–84 (1998), as reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 
226. 
194 Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs, supra note 192. 
195 Thorpe, supra note 193. 
196 See Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpretive Sovereignty: A Research Agenda, 33 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 111 (2010–11). 
197 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 14–20 (1999) as 
reprinted in DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 190, at 108–09. 
198 E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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or the “several States.” As discussed above, the United States treated Indian 
tribes on par with foreign nations for many decades.200 
As Justice Thomas’ Lara concurrence implies, the Court has sidestepped 
these hard sovereignty questions under political question doctrine.201 
However, political question doctrine is a judicial prudential standing 
doctrine, not a constitutional mandate.202 As shown by Bush v. Gore, the 
Court can, and does, decide political questions.203 In fact, political question 
doctrine may have no discernible bounds.204 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence suggests three possible changes to Indian 
nation sovereignty.205 First, the Court could void the 1871 Act blocking the 
President from negotiating Indian nation treaties.206 In effect, this would 
restore Indian nations’ sovereignty by making it equal to foreign nations’ 
sovereignty. Second, the Court could overrule Wheeler207 and destroy 
Indian nation sovereignty, thus making tribes completely, and only, subject 
to federal law. Third, Indian nations could have some sovereignty unlike 
                                                                                            
200 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 209; see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 78–79. 
201 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Further, federal policy itself could be thought to be inconsistent with this 
residual-sovereignty theory. In 1871, Congress enacted a statute that purported 
to prohibit entering into treaties with ‘Indian nation[s] or 
tribe[s.]’ . . . Although this Act is constitutionally suspect . . . , it nevertheless 
reflects the view of the political branches that the tribes had become a purely 
domestic matter. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (primary modern case 
on political question doctrine). See generally CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES & POLICIES, 
supra note 2, at 129–47; CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 129–
47.  
202 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210–26. 
203 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding the 2000 Presidential election for George 
W. Bush over Albert Gore). 
204 See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 
(1976). 
205 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
206 See id. at 216. 
207 Id. 
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foreign nations, yet consistent with the Constitution. For instance, though 
not proposed by Thomas, the Court could hold Indian nations have 
sovereignty like the “several States.”208 
The second alternative, overruling Wheeler and destroying all Indian 
sovereignty, is trivial to analyze; all Court decisions confirming any Indian 
sovereignty would be overruled.209 
The rest of this article considers the first and third alternatives. The first 
alternative, restoring the President’s negotiating power, would be the most 
radical change in practice, but the simplest constitutionally; it would merely 
restore the original power balance between the executive and Congress. The 
effects of changing sovereignty via the first or third alternatives will be 
analyzed in the context of executive-order reservations, particularly the 
situation in Karuk. 
1. Indian Nations as Sovereign Foreign Nations 
If Indian nations had sovereignty on par with foreign nations, the 
president would have full power to make treaties and executive agreements 
with them.210 Treaty and agreement provisions needing domestic funding 
would be subject to congressional appropriations.211 Thus, Congress could, 
                                                                                            
208 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone 
Wolf, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 57 (2002–03) (arguing that Indian nations should have state-like 
sovereignty) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Securing Tribal Sovereignty]. See generally T. 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002) [hereinafter ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY]. 
209 E.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 193 (majority opinion); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 
(1989). 
210 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (vacating suit against President Carter by noting that abrogating a 
treaty with Taiwan is a political rather than a judicial question); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (noting the president’s “well-established authority to recognize, and 
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments”). 
211 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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in effect, abrogate those provisions, yet it would have no power to stop the 
President from recognizing Indian nations as independent governments and 
negotiating with them.212 The President could independently abrogate 
treaties with Indian nations without Congress’ approval.213 
Of course, neither the President nor Congress could change the 
boundaries of independent sovereign Indian nations. Neither the President 
nor Congress has this power over foreign nations. Thus, Indian nations 
having the same boundaries as when the United States was founded could 
not have the President or Congress change their boundaries. 
The President could make a self-executing treaty with an Indian nation as 
with a foreign nation,214 which Congress would need to ratify.215 If the self-
executing treaty required no further action by Congress for it to be 
enforceable, Congress would have no further power over it. For instance, 
the President could sign a treaty with an Indian nation regarding its 
reservation’s boundaries. Presidents made these kinds of treaties with 
Indian nations in the nineteenth century.216 The treaty would only come into 
effect after Senate ratification.217 As a treaty over reservation boundaries of 
land originally and solely held by an Indian nation, it would clearly be self-
executing. Thus, Congress would be powerless to change the reservation’s 
boundaries. If a certain treaty had other provisions, the boundary provision 
would be self-executing if the provisions were severable. 
This reasoning would apply to reservations made by an executive order in 
accord with Indian nation treaties signed by the President. Suppose the 
                                                                                            
212 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996 (Powell, J., 
concurring); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
213 Id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring). 
214 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
215 Id. 
216 See PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 136 (“most of these treaties dealt with boundaries and 
cessions to the United States”); id. at 226–34 (discussing treaties used as a federal 
government tool to gain Indian land). 
217 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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President signed a treaty with an Indian nation over reservation boundaries. 
As just explained, that treaty would be self-executing. An executive order 
recognizing those boundaries would not need congressional funding. Thus, 
Congress would be powerless to change that reservation’s boundaries 
memorialized in domestic law by the executive order. 
Instead of treaties, the President could sign executive agreements with 
Indian nations. For instance, the President could make an agreement with an 
Indian nation to respect its boundaries.218 As the President would not submit 
the agreement for Senate ratification, the agreement would immediately 
bind the United States. 
Likewise, presidents formed many executive-order reservations in similar 
settings.219 At the end of various wars with Indian nations, many presidents 
negotiated agreements with tribes to respect their boundaries.220 To 
implement those agreements, presidents issued executive orders reserving 
land.221 Thus, in this analysis, executive orders would bind the United States 
to respect those reservation boundaries and would not be subject to review 
by the Senate or by full Congress. 
This analysis assumes the president has almost complete foreign affairs 
power. This assumption comports with the traditional Steel Seizure 
analysis.222 In that scheme, executive power is maximized and unrivaled in 
foreign affairs.223 Thus, though presidents would only rely on their innate 
power, these treaties, executive agreements, and executive orders would 
withstand congressional challenge if they related only to reservations’ 
                                                                                            
218 See generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
219 See PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 329–39. 
220 Id. at 312, 320–22. 
221 Id. 
222 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
223 Id. 
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boundaries and thus remained part of foreign affairs. To the extent that 
these orders and agreements would have domestic effects—for instance, on 
states—they would be binding if they required no further direct action by 
Congress.224 
Cohen225 and Judge Newman, in the Karuk dissent,226 argued that 
Congress’ acquiescence implied executive-order reservations could not be 
changed by Congress without creating a taking.227 In essence, these 
arguments rely on the Steel Seizure scheme supporting executive action in 
domestic affairs when faced with Congress’ inaction.228 Judge Newman also 
argued the President acted with Congress’ approval in forming the 
reservations.229 Thus, the President acted with maximum power in the Steel 
Seizure scheme in forming the Hoopa Valley Reservation by executive 
order.230 
If Indian nations had foreign-nation sovereignty, the aboriginal title and 
extinguishment by conquest doctrines—on which Judge Rader relied in 
Karuk231—would become quite troubling. These doctrines started with 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh.232 
                                                                                            
224 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
225 See COHEN, supra note 30, at 1059. 
226 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
227 See also PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 329 (noting courts sustaining executive-order 
reservations based on longstanding congressional acquiescence). 
228 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 601–11 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
229 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1382. 
230 See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
231 Karuk Tribe of Cal., 209 F.3d at 1373–74. 
232 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Marshall, C.J.). Perhaps Justice Marshall’s opinion 
sounded sympathetic towards Indian nations 200 years ago. Now, his opinion’s 
references to aboriginals without Christianity sounds racist. For a thorough critique of 
Marshall’s discovery doctrine, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal 
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Contrary to aboriginal title and extinguishment by conquest, the United 
States renounced annexing territory by force with the Stimson Doctrine.233 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson served under President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.234 In 1932, Secretary Stimson wrote to China and Japan stating 
that the United States did not recognize Japan’s 1931 seizure of Manchuria 
as annexing territory.235 
Thus, in modern times, it is hard to picture the United States conquering 
or taking land from a foreign nation and ending that nation’s sovereignty 
over that land. For instance, during World War II, the United States 
conquered Germany and Japan but left them intact as sovereign nations. In 
fact, the post-World War II war crimes charged against Nazi and Japanese 
leaders were partly based on the Stimson Doctrine.236 
Finally, in passing, if the United States deemed Indian nations to be like 
foreign nations, US federal and state courts might recognize tribal-court 
judgments under international comity.237 
2. Indian Nations as Sovereign Domestic States 
In some cases, Indian nations may have ceded land to the United States in 
exchange for benefits. This is like domestic states ceding sovereignty to the 
federal government in exchange for benefits.238 Of course, domestic states 
                                                                                            
Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian 
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986). 
233 Ward Churchill, Subverting the Law of Nations: American Indian Rights and U.S. 
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234 See id. 
235 Id. at 73 n.3. 
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237 Dan St. John, Recognizing Tribal Judgments in Federal Courts Through the Lens of 
Comity, Comment, 89 DENVER U. L. REV. 523, 535–37, 539–44 (2012). 
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did not cede land but certain political rights,239 which are arguably less 
valuable than land. 
If Indian nations had the same sovereignty as domestic states,240 the 
nations’ boundaries would not change. This is the circumstance with the 
several states. Likewise, Indian nations’ boundaries would not change after 
the initial bargain.241 For executive-order reservations formed under treaties 
between the United States and Indian nations the boundaries should not 
change. Thus, boundaries of reservations, such as the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation, would not be subject to redrawing by Congress.242 
As domestic sovereigns equal to states, Indian nations would be far less 
subject to presidential power. The traditional Steel Seizure scheme would 
subject the President’s power to much more control by Congress.243 
Also, US courts might recognize tribal courts. Federal courts might apply 
abstention doctrines against interfering with states’ rights to avoid 
interfering with Indian nations’ rights.244 State courts might recognize 
tribal-court judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.245  
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The federal government already treats Indian nations like states in some 
instances. Most notably, the federal government treats Indian nations on par 
with states for a broad range of environmental laws.246 For instance, the 
Clean Water Act lets the EPA entrust standard-setting to tribes.247 
At least two early treaties proposed treating Indian nations as states.248 A 
Delawares treaty allowed for forming an Indian state headed by the 
Delawares and “representation in Congress.”249 The Cherokees also 
exchanged representation in the House of Representatives as part of 
removal.250 Neither treaty ever resulted in Indian representatives in 
Congress.251 
During the republic’s first hundred years, various entities proposed 
forming Indian states as part of the United States.252 Whether an Indian 
nation were deemed a foreign nation or a US “territory,” nothing in 
principle would stop an Indian nation from asking the United States for 
statehood. But admitting an Indian nation as a state would make the Bill of 
Rights’ constitutional strictures apply to the state via the Fourteenth 
Amendment253 and obviate the statutory demands of the 1968 Indian Civil 
Rights Act254 for that nation/state. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court doctrine has sharply distinguished between mainstream 
and Indian law separation of powers. Justice Thomas recently questioned 
the contradictions in separation of powers doctrine in the Indian sovereignty 
context. As the Indian Commerce Clause deals with Indian tribes, foreign 
nations, and the several states, treating Indian tribes as having the same 
sovereignty as either foreign nations or the states would be a natural change 
within constitutional doctrine. Changing Indian sovereignty to match either 
foreign nation or domestic state sovereignty would substantially shift the 
power balance between the president and Congress, especially regarding 
executive-order reservations. Those reservations would get far more 
protection against congressional reshaping than under current Indian law 
power-separation doctrine.  
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